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ARTICLES
SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN
BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC BANKING:
A REVIEW AND RESPONSE
JOSEPH A. SMITH, JR.+

Fairness in meeting the financial needs of the poor and
working poor is a matter of great current interest to financial
services firms, regulators and advocates for the poor. The issue
manifests itself in the public domain in two distinct ways: (i)
legislative and regulatory action regarding predatory lending;1 and
(ii) congressional proposals to use public funds to create incentives
for financial institutions to provide services to people and
communities in need However the fairness issue is addressed, its
gravamen is that the poor and working poor do not have adequate
access to financial services. To the extent that such persons have
access to financial services, it is at a price that is substantially
greater than the price for wealthier persons. This issue remains in
the public arena nearly a quarter of a century after the adoption of
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), which was
enacted to address the credit needs of low and moderate income
communities? If the fairness issue, in its various manifestations, is
Counsel, Thacher Proffitt & Wood, Washington, D.C.; A.B., 1971, Davidson
College; J.D., 1974, University of Virginia. From April 1992 to May, 2000, Mr. Smith
was General Counsel of Centura Banks, Inc. and Centura Bank. The views
expressed in this article are the author's own and are not necessarily those of Centura
Banks, Inc., Centura Bank or Thacher Proffitt & Wood.
1. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A (1999); Abusive Lending Practices,
[Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63,789 (OCC Advisory Letter No.
2000-7, July 25, 2000); Press Release, Banking Agencies Issue Guidance on
Supervision of Subprime Lending, at http://www.fdic.gov/news/press/2001/
pr0901.html (Jan. 31,2001).
2. See, e.g., First Accounts Act of 2000, H.R. 4490, 106th Cong. § 2(b) (2000);
American Community Renewal and New Markets Empowerment Act, S. 2779, 106
Cong. (2000).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).
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not intractable, it is the next worst thing.
Michael A. Stegman, Chair of the Curriculum in Public
Policy Analysis and Director of the Center for Community
Capitalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
addresses important aspects of this issue in his recent book,
Savings for the Poor: The Hidden Benefits of Electronic Banking.4
Professor Stegman comes to this task well prepared, having served
as Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research at the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development before
returning to Chapel Hill in July of 1997. Savings for the Poor is
not merely a study of the U.S. Department of Treasury's
implementation of the Congressional mandate that welfare
payments be made by electronic means. It also argues for an
overhaul of welfare policy "from entitlement programs to policies
that promote work, self-sufficiency, and wealth accumulation." 5
Savings for the Poor is a well-written and serious work on
an important issue of public policy. It deserves the careful
attention of and a serious response from those interested in the
problem of poverty and the capacity of our banking institutions to
address it. An attempt at such a response is set forth below.
Section I reviews the book in broad outline;6 Section II comments
on the book's treatment of financial institutions;7 and Section III
assesses the book as a brief for a change in public policy."
I. REVIEW OFBOOK

Savings for the Poor chronicles the efforts by the Treasury
Department to implement "EFT '99," a legislative mandate
contained in the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996.' The
mandate required that the recipients of a number of federal
benefit programs receive their payments via electronic means.
4. MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF
ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999).
5. Id. at 2.
6. See infra notes 6-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
9. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3332 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000) (discussing mandatory direct
deposits).
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Professor Stegman points out that the original policy rationale of
EFT '99 had more to do with governmental efficiency than with
bringing the poor and working poor into the financial
mainstream. I" In the public sector, as in private enterprise, the cost
of transactions handled electronically is a fraction of those affected
While the logistical challenges of
through paper documents."
setting up a "non-paper" payment system were significant, "the
cost savings to the government-only 2 cents for an EFT payment
compared to 43 cents for a check payment-were deemed
substantial enough to justify the transition."' 2
Cost aside, the Treasury also had to deal with the fact that
the use of electronic means to make benefit payments required
that the recipient have a bank account, which a substantial number
of benefit recipients did not have. "3Given this circumstance,
implementation of EFT '99 required that benefit recipients
without bank accounts be brought into the banking system.
Savings for the Poor recounts the Treasury's attempt to achieve
this objective and the response of the financial services industry,
advocates for the poor and the poor themselves, to this attempt.
A.

The Stakeholders

1. "Unbanked"
Savings for the Poor sets the stage for its presentation of
Treasury's efforts to implement EFT '99 with a detailed discussion
of the stakeholders in this activity, beginning with the "unbanked."
The unbanked are those Americans who do not have a bank
account. As pointed out by Professor Stegman, this group is larger
than the target market for EFT '99:
Nationwide, an estimated 13 percent of U.S.
families-including up to 10 million federal benefit
10. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 5-7.

11. Id. at 5.
12. Id.

13. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
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recipients-currently have no bank accounts.
Among federal benefit recipients, the unbanked are
more likely to be people of color, younger, and
poorer than other benefit recipients.
The universe of unbanked Americans, both
recipients and non-recipients of federal benefits,
represents one third of all minority households.
One in four renters, one in six of those under 35
years of age, and 15 percent of the working poorfamilies earning between $10,000 and $25,000-do
not have checking accounts.
Among welfare
recipients, as many as three out of four are
estimated to be without a bank account.14
While much in the quoted passage will not surprise a reader even
casually familiar with the issues confronting the poor and working
poor, the numbers are striking nonetheless. The group described
above is a substantial one, and the absence of banking
relationships subjects them to inconveniences and costs that
worsen already strained circumstances.
After describing the unbanked, Professor Stegman analyzes
the factors that most affect the poor and working poor in their
relationships, or lack thereof, with financial institutions. Based on
recent studies of the unbanked, he presents a sophisticated
analysis that shows how various combinations of variables interact
to keep people out of the banking system. Many of the variables
will come as no surprise to the reader: age, race, gender, level of
education, citizenship status, language proficiency and income
level."5 By establishing a base case for a particular subgroup of the
unbanked and then altering one or a few variables, the analysis
isolates the impact of the variables on the likelihood of being
unbanked.1 6 For example:

14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 24-30.
16. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 30.
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[the likelihood that] a non-Hispanic white male, age
39, with 12.73 years of education and $22,000 in
annual income, who is a renter and a U.S. citizen, is
unmarried, reads and speaks English well, works
either full- or part-time, lives in a low-poverty
neighborhood, and lives or works near a bank...
would be unbanked is just 6%.... [I]f the base case
were an Asian male.., but all other characteristics
were the same, the probability of the individual
being unbanked would fall by half, to 3 percent....
[I]f Hispanic is substituted for non-Hispanic white,
and all other variables are held constant, the
probability of the individual being unbanked
increases from 6 to 7%, a statistically insignificant
change.... The probability increases to 10% for an
individual with eight years of education and falls
steadily as education level rises.... The probability
of being unbanked also varies inversely with
income.... [W]hen the base case individual's
income is $4,000 instead of the sample mean of
$22,000, the probability of being unbanked more
than doubles from 6 to 13 percent.17
The research in Savings for the Poor also highlights other
important factors that affect the unbanked, including cultural
issues and sources of information.18 For example, the unbanked
from Central and South America associate banking in their home
country only with the rich, and in this country with difficulties of
language and custom that make the transaction of business
difficult. 9 Furthermore, research shows that television is most
likely the source of information about financial services among the
unbanked-a fact not lost on "non-traditional" firms, such as check

17. Id. at 30-31.

18. Id. at 34.
19. Id. (citation omitted); Squeezing the Banks, ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 2000, at 53
(discussing to the phenomenon of the unbanked in England as arising from: (i)
conflict of banking with the tenets of Islam; (ii) the need for a driver's license or
other identification documents; and (iii) association of banking with the rich only).
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cashers, that use television and personal networks as their primary
marketing tool."
At the conclusion of the chapter on the unbanked,
Professor Stegman points out that "[f]or EFT to succeed will
require more than product development; it will also require new
marketing strategies."' 1 These strategies, to be successful, should
be based on the market analysis discussed above. Professor
Stegman's analysis of the unbanked is complex and requires
careful attention. The effort required is well worth it because it
gives the reader a clear look at the unbanked and the reasons for
their circumstances.' Savings for the Poor is a valuable resource
for any person or institution that intends to market financial
services to the poor and working poor in general, and the
unbanked in particular.
2. Financial Services Industry
Professor Stegman then discusses the financial services
industry, both traditional banks and their "non-bank" competitors.
With regard to banks:
[t]he interplay of many factors-among them the
deregulation of interest rate ceilings in the 1980s,
new technology, and growing competition from
nondepository institutions-has led to a significant
decline in the number of financial institutions in the
United States and has driven banks to charge for
services they formerly subsidized with cheap,
regulated deposits.'

20. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 34.
21. Id. at 36.

22. Among the genuinely disheartening findings of the research is that AfricanAmericans are the group most likely to be unbanked, even after controlling for other
factors. Id. Professor Stegman asserts that this finding "reinforces the idea that,
despite legal gains, powerful forms of racial discrimination remain that disadvantage
blacks relative to other racial and ethnic groups." Id. at 37. Those who disagree with
this conclusion, including the author of this article, need to do some work to
understand and correct this unsettling fact.
23. Id. at 2.
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Professor Stegman associates the aforementioned factors
with increases in fees,24 closing of branches in poor neighborhoods?
and a related increase in the number of the unbanked.2 He goes
on to discuss how developments in information processing and
telecommunications, such as the telephone and personal computer,
have increased the delivery channels available to banks and their
non-bank competitors to attract and serve customers.'
While
recognizing the potential that technology presents in terms of
meeting the needs of the poor by dramatically reducing the cost of
providing services, Savings for the Poor observes that the cost of
such technology may be beyond the means of the poor and
working poor. This effect is another aspect of the "digital
divide."'
Because banks cannot serve the poor and working poor
profitably, other "non-traditional" firms, such as check cashing
firms, step in to provide those services. Professor Stegman points
out that such firms are able to do so by operating in less expensive
locations for substantially greater hours with a sales-oriented
culture that shows a greater appreciation for the culture and
preferred sources of information of the target market.29 More
important to profitability, the fees, charges and interest rates
charged by non-traditional firms are materially higher than those
charged by traditional banks.'
This aspect of the business
practices of non-traditional firms is a source of continuing conflict
with advocates for the poor and working poor, including the
debate over EFr '99, and the current debate over predatory
lending.

24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 2.
26. STEGMAN, supra note 4,, at 17.

27. Id. at 38.
28. Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 64.
3. Id. at 66.
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3. Advocates for the Poor
Advocates for the poor are not directly treated in Savings
for the Poor;rather they are portrayed by what they advocate and,
in this context, by what they oppose. Professor Stegman notes:
[because of] serious questions about consumer
protection, access to technology and services, and
costs.., the move to electronic benefits delivery is
opposed by some powerful consumer groups and
community development advocates, who believe
EFT '99 compels unbanked recipients into
relationships that they have already determined are
detrimental to themselves for the federal
government's direct benefit."
While these advocates were not the primary facilitators in
the implementation of EFT '99, their activities were material in
determining its outcome. Professor Stegman makes clear that
support from community activists is crucial if the optimum use of
EFT '99 and related savings incentives is to become a reality."
They are clearly a target audience of this book.
B.

Implementation of EFT '99

Having set the stage with its discussion of the stakeholders,
Savings for the Poorthen reviews the implementation of EFT '99.33
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's (OCC) rulemaking process began in November 1996. The EFT '99 account's
attributes were not published for comment until November 1998
and agreements with financial institutions to actually offer the

31. Id.
32. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 10.
33. Id. at 83-112.
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account were not completed until seven months later.' Although
EFT '99 began as a mandatory payment mechanism for benefit
recipients offered on a competitive basis through the banking
system, it became a voluntary payment system for benefits
recipients provided through a system of accounts that were
essentially mandatory as to terms and conditions.
What happened? Why did the nature of the program
change so drastically? Through the rulemaking process for EFT
'99, the Treasury Department attempted to craft a program that
would harness the competitive forces of the marketplace to serve
the poor and working poor with the agreement of the
stakeholders, financial institutions, community advocates and the
poor.
The rulemaking process became a long and complex
negotiation among the stakeholders involving every aspect of EFT
'99. Traditional banking institutions were less enthusiastic about
offering the product than expected and had serious concerns about
the fees that could be charged, the costs of administration
(particularly compliance with consumer regulations) and the loss
of control over the opening and closing of accounts.
Nontraditional competitors wanted to participate, but they
intended to charge fees that were unacceptable to consumer
advocates. Consumer advocates sought to limit the fees that
financial services intermediaries could charge and were critical of
the mandatory nature of the program.
As a consequence of this negotiation, the Treasury relented
with regard to several aspects of the program. Namely, the
mandatory nature of the program was changed so that benefit
recipients could elect whether to receive payments electronically,3'
the institutions allowed to offer the EFT account were limited to
traditional banks' and the Treasury circumscribed the terms, fees
and charges related to the program.' Professor Stegman assesses
this outcome as follows:

34. Id. at 84.

35. Id. at 85-86.
36. Id. at 96.
37. Id. at 99-100.
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While Treasury's vision of bringing millions of
unbanked recipients into the financial mainstream
remains a powerful one, there is no question that
EFT '99 has been severely compromised during the
rulemaking process.... The cumulative effect of
Treasury's decisions has been to significantly
lengthen the transition to EFT, greatly reduce the
number of unbanked who will be brought into the
financial mainstream through the EF1T process, and
deflate the economics of ETAs by reducing their
market size.'
The foregoing is not to say the EFT '99 is a failure.
Professor Stegman points out that EFT '99 has been a catalyst for
a grassroots campaign of financial education of the poor and
working poor. 9 This campaign has not been contained at federal
level. Savings for the Poorprovides a description of a number of
effective efforts at the state level through electronic benefit
transfer (EBT) systems that do not require the opening of a bank
account. Recipients receive a card that entitles them to "draw"
against the value of their benefits, either through merchants of
goods purchased
or, in some instances, cash withdrawals from
4°
ATMs.
Savings for the Poor then presents an "EFT action agenda"
that proposes a refocusing of public policy regarding the poor and
working poor to emphasize the accumulation of wealth. 4' This
agenda includes, among other things: (i) enacting a national
individual development account program to create incentives for
saving; (ii) altering administration of the Community
Reinvestment Act to increase the possible credit for service
38. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 118. This conclusion is confirmed by a recent
report that about 5,000 people have opened accounts under EFT '99 and that,
although approximately 600 banks, thrifts and credit unions are offering such
accounts, most of the current customers have accounts with one institution, Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico. Lisa Daigle, E-Beneflt Accounts Fail to Gain Broad Usage,
Big-bankEfforts Could Revive Programin '01, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12,2000, at 1.
39. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 84.
40. Id. at 114.

41. Id. at 158.
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offered in providing individual development accounts and
electronic funds transfer payments; and (iii) regulating check
cashing operations regarding government benefits payments.
The book ends with a clear statement of the author's view
that it is a political, social and moral necessity that America apply
the tools of technology to serve the needs of the poor and working
poor.
II.

TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Bankers are an important subject of Savings for the Poor,
both in terms of what they have and have not done for the poor
and working poor. Professor Stegman identifies the closing of
traditional bank branches in low and moderate income
neighborhoods and increases in service charges, as contributors to
the growth in number of the unbanked, more in sorrow than in
anger. He attributes these actions to deregulation and increased
competition. Describing Treasury's reduction of expectations for
EFT '99 in September 1997, he says that Treasury was "stung by
the industry's indifference" to the program.42 In a speech at that
time, John Hawke, then Treasury Undersecretary, remarked:
Industry response to EFT '99 has been
disappointing so far. I have heard far more in the
way of complaints about the possible costs of EFT
'99 for banks than about the need to change public
opinion about electronic payments. I also find, to
my great surprise, that almost eighteen months after
the EFT '99 law was enacted, there are some
bankers who have never even heard of it, and many
who have only the vaguest idea of what it is about. 3
In light of these comments, what is one to think of the
bankers? With regard to their conduct toward the poor and
working poor, are banks: (i) morally obtuse or worse; (ii) too

42. Id. at 91-92.
43. Id. at 92.
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dumb to recognize a business opportunity when they see it; or (iii)
acting rationally in the face of a difficult market? Although
Professor Stegman does not indicate which he thinks is the case,
his proposal to revise and extend the CRA suggests that he
believes that bankers need regulatory prodding to play the role he
thinks they should in addressing the needs of the poor and working
poor.
For the reasons set forth below, I submit that the bankers
acted rationally towards EFT '99 in the face of a difficult market. I
speak with some experience in this regard, having served as
general counsel of a bank holding company for eight years,
including the period of time covered in Savings for the Poor.
During that time, my colleagues and I attempted to extend the
firm's business to the poor and working poor in a way that was
consistent with our overall business objectives, including
profitability. For reasons of institutional values and the practical
consideration that at a minimum a satisfactory CRA rating was
required to grow by acquisition, we did our best to make the loans
and provide the other services necessary to meet the needs of the
communities we served, including a number of low and moderate
income communities. In the main, I believe we succeeded;
however, such success was not easy and brought with it only
marginal economic returns to the corporation. Because the
profitability of serving the poor is central to the banks' attitude
toward EFT '99 and other community development activities, a
discussion of what it means to be profitable is set forth below.
The financial services companies discussed in Savings for
the Poor are private corporations owned by shareholders and
financed through capital markets."4 In seeking capital themselves,
these corporations compete with a wide variety of other

44. The author acknowledges that this statement, while true, is not complete.
Banking organizations as a rule are chartered on an undertaking to meet public

convenience and necessity and benefit from the public insurance of deposits through
the FDIC. This aspect of the banking franchise leads many commentators, including
Professor Stegman, to point out that service to the poor and working poor "goes with
the territory," which position is affirmed by the continued application of the CRA.
That having been said, the point remains that banks can only meet their social
obligations and applicable regulatory requirements, including satisfactory capital,
earnings and liquidity, if they are profitable.
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investments available to investors and lenders. To attract capital,
each of these firms seeks to obtain a positive risk-adjusted return
by earning net operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) that exceeds
the firm's cost of capital. This excess, or "economic value added"
(EVA) is the true economic profit generated by the firm."u
Achievement of positive EVA creates value for shareholders by
increasing the value of their holdings; failure to do so has negative
consequences for the firm, its shareholders and, more and more
frequently, management."
Other things being equal, profit maximization tends to
disfavor services to the poor and working poor because such
services are generally in materially smaller amounts than those to
the more affluent. Schedule 1 analyzes this problem with regard to
three hypothetical loans with various principal amounts: Loan 1,
$1,000; Loan 2, $50,000; and Loan 3, $200,000.' 7

45. EVA is a registered trademark of Stem, Stewart & Co. The definitive work

on this concept is G. BENNETr STEWART,

THE QUEST FOR VALUE:

A

GUIDE FOR

(1991).
46. It is interesting to note that one bank executive, quoted with approval by
Professor Stegman, has left the firm with which he was associated at the time of the
quote as a result of a "management reorganization." A second executive, also quoted
with approval, has experienced a reduction in role arguably related to corporate
performance. Furthermore, an institution mentioned approvingly in Savings for the
Poorhas recently been the subject of a control contest. These circumstances suggest,
if nothing else, that an institution must generate an adequate return to shareholders
in order to retain the right to meet community needs.
47. As a member of the reserve army of the innumerate, the author has attached
Schedules 1 and 2 to this article with due humility. The calculations are of the backof-the-envelope variety and are intended to highlight the issues under consideration
rather than as virtual reality. This caveat having been given, I believe the Schedules
are generally correct.
SENIOR MANAGERS
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SCHEDULE 1
LOAN PROFITABILITY
LOAN1

LOAN2

LOAN3

$1,000

$50,000

$200,000

Coupon (@8%)

80

4,000

16,000

Cost of Fundse

(45)

(2,250)

(9,000)

Origination Fee49

10

500

2,000

Gross Margin

45

2,250

9,000

Expenses

(22)

(1,125)

(4,500)

Tax (@30%)

(7)

(338)

(1,350)

NOPAT

16

788

3,150

Capital Charge'

13

650

2,600

Economic

3

138

550

Principal
Amount

(@50%)

Value Added

Schedule 1 assumes the following: each loan has equal
revenues (a coupon of 8% and an origination fee of 1%); equal
associated expenses; 90% of the loans are funded by bank
borrowings at 5%; the remainder of the loan is funded by lender's
equity. It is also assumed that no difference exists in the risk
between the three loans and accordingly each has a 13% cost of
capital. Based on the foregoing assumptions, each of the loans
described on Schedule 1 is "profitable," in that each results in
positive NOPAT and generates a positive EVA. That being said,
Loan 3 generates substantially greater margin and EVA than
either Loan 1 or Loan 2. Furthermore, loans to first-time or
unsophisticated borrowers are costlier and riskier than larger loans

48. Assumes 90% of Principal Amount is funded at 5%.
49. One percent of principal amount.
50. Capital allocated to the loan (10%) times 13% capital charge.
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to more seasoned and wealthier borrowers, such as Loan 3.51
Adjusting for origination costs (certainly) and risks (probably)
would tip the balance further in favor of Loan 3. Adding even a
nominal charge for processing would drive Loan 1 into "negative
EVA;" if such processing cost were over $100 per loan, Loan 2
would reduce or eliminate its EVA contribution. If the capital
charge for the smaller loans were increased to reflect greater risk,
their EVA contribution would certainly be eliminated.
Based on the foregoing, the economic incentive to the
lender is to make larger loans rather than smaller ones since, for
the same amount of work, the lender generates significantly
greater gross margin and EVA. In order to generate a maximum
return to the firm, incentive compensation to originators for large
loans is substantially greater than those for small ones. This
conclusion is supported by actual experience, particularly in the
area of home mortgage lending. As a rule, mortgage originators
are compensated on production volume and it takes a significant
amount of coaxing to convince them to originate small loans
generally, and non-conforming small loans, in particular.
A similar analysis can be applied to the provision of
services to the poor and working poor through the opening of
branches where they live. Schedule 2 estimates of the cost of
operating a branch to determine the level of activity necessary to
operate profitably.

51. I am certain that those experienced with lending to the poor and working

poor will argue with me about issue of risk. The good news is that a growing body of
evidence on the performance of loans to this segment of the market suggests, at least

in the affordable housing portfolios generated by banks, that there may not be a
significant additional risk of default. Regularity of payment may be another matter,
but as the accumulation of evidence continues and time passes, we will be more
knowledgeable on this issue. For one interpretation of the currently available data,
see Howard Husock, Busting up Neighborhoods,FORBES, Sept. 18, 2000, at 36. In

this article, the author, a Contributing Editor, of the Manhattan Institute's CrrY
JoURNAL, argues for tougher lending standards as a way to protect the investments of

poor and working poor people in their neighborhoods.
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SCHEDULE 2
ESTIMATED BRANCH COSTS
(Annualized)
EXPENSE ITEM

BRANCH COST

Rent 2

$36,000

Personnel53

$60,000

Overhead

$24,000

Total

$120,000

The average branch costs $3 00 ,0 0 0 .Y Accepting that
amount as a starting point, Schedule 2 estimates the occupancy
cost of such a facility at 1% of such amount per month (including
up-fit and equipment).
Schedule 2 assumes three full-time
employees each earning $20,000 per year and 25% overhead of
combined occupancy and personnel costs. Based on those
assumptions, the hypothetical branch requires annual revenue of
$120,000 to cover its cost of operation. Taking the $11 profitability
estimate for EFT '99 accounts,56 and doubling it to reflect expense
consistently with Schedule 1, it would take over 5,400 accounts to
cover the cost of the hypothetical branch. Using the gross margin
figures from Schedule 1, excluding fees, it would take over 2,600
loans comparable to Loan 1 to cover such costs, 54 loans such as
Loan 2, but only thirteen loans like Loan 3, to cover these costs. If
one assumes that accounts and loans involving the poor and
working poor tend to be small, it takes a substantial volume of
activity for a branch to reach break-even status, much less earn a
profit.'
52. One percent of estimated cost of branch ($300,000) per month.
53. Three employees at a salary of $20,000 p.a. each.
54. Twenty-five percent of rent and personnel expense.
55. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 45.

56. Id. at 103.
57. An interesting outcome of the research on the unbanked contained in Savings
for the Pooris that the likelihood of being unbanked "is not affected by whether one
lives or works near a bank." Id. at 32 (citation omitted). The analysis goes on to
point out that the extent of a neighborhood's poverty has a positive correlation with
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This conclusion is supported by my experience in practice.
During my service as general counsel of a bank, my colleagues and
I established an outreach program to the African-American
community in a major North Carolina city. This arrangement was
centered in an inner-city branch that was a marginal performer.
Over time, the increase in activity through our outreach program
raised the profitability of the branch to a positive basis, even
considering EVA. This result took the better part of two years to
achieve and involved a significant amount of management time
and energy that had to be directed from other activities. We were
proud of this effort and learned a great deal from it; however, on a
pure economic basis, the effort expended did not bring a
commensurate return.
It was with this background and perspective that my
colleagues and I considered EFT '99 when it was announced.
Contrary to Mr. Hawke's comment quoted above, we were not
unaware of EF '99; rather, we were trying to determine how to
deal with it. Our concerns were similar to those attributed to
bankers in Savings for the Poor. In our view, it was not likely that
we could meet the requirements of EFT '99 through conventional,
off-the-shelf products; accordingly, substantial development
resources were going to have to be expended to participate.
Further, we were concerned with the administrative requirements
of the program, including the generation of the monthly paper
statement from a cost perspective, particularly given the $3 per
month maximum charge imposed by EFT '99.59 For doing this
additional work, EFT '99 appeared to hold in prospect enough
small accounts to be a burden, but not enough to make a profit.
We were not indifferent or hostile to EFT '99; resigned is more
like it. It did not appear likely to us that EFT '99 was going to
unbanked status; however, and accordingly, Professor Stegman interprets the
evidence as "mixed." Id. at 31.
58. See also Laura Mandaro, Union Bank, Check-Casher Team Up, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 25, 2000, at 1 (discussing Union Bank's attempt to serve low and moderate

income communities by locating branches within the offices of check cashers). As
the Union Bank executive responsible for this venture points out, "It's adding
services to a fully financed platform that's the economic magic of this." Id. at 6. The
article points out that this venture has been criticized by community activists. Id.
59. STEGMAN, supra note 4, at 95-96.
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generate book profit for our firm, much less positive EVA.
Savings for the Poor highlights firms that probably are
generating positive EVA while serving the poor and working poor:
the "nontraditional competitors." As noted above, these firms
compete successfully because of convenience and knowledge of
the market. Their financial returns are better because their cost
structure is lower. They are, at least until recently, less regulated
and charge substantially more than traditional institutions. The
amount of such fees and charges has come under increasing
criticism from advocates, legislators and regulators. Such criticism
kept the non-traditional competitors out of the field with regard to
EFT '99 and limited the amount that traditional competitors could
charge for EFT '99 services. Given these limitations, Treasury's
frustration with bankers is a little difficult to understand. In the
absence of significant profit, firms organized to achieve profit will
have little or no incentive to serve any market, low income or
otherwise.
The foregoing response to Savings for the Poor is not
intended either to blame the poor and working poor for their
circumstances or to confer "victim" status on bankers. Whatever
one might otherwise think of the CRA, it has had a profound
educative effect on banking organizations about the needs of
people not yet reached by the traditional financial system.
Further, as public institutions, most banking organizations have a
profound sense of responsibility for the communities they serve.
However, banking organizations have obligations to employees,
depositors and shareholders. These obligations cannot be fulfilled
unless the institution operates at the most profitable level of which
it is capable. If, in serving the poor and working poor, a bank
cannot charge rates, fees and charges sufficient to create positive
economic value added, from the perspective of the bank, CRA /
community outreach becomes an unfunded mandate or charity. In
either case, the amount of capital that the firm can commit to such
activity in such circumstances is limited. Savings for the Poor
chronicles a process where the stakeholders did not come to an
optimum resolution of their differences, in substantial part because
of a profound disagreement on what an appropriate level of profit
was for the EFT '99 account. As a result, capital has not flowed
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into this activity in the amounts Treasury anticipated.
As noted above, Professor Stegman is undaunted by the
outcome of the EFT '99 debate among the stakeholders. He
showcases a number of successes fostered by the program and by
efforts in a number of states to employ technology to serve the
poor. His argument reflects an open mind about methods and
delivery channels for financial services to the poor. Savings for the
Poor is an invitation to further dialogue among the stakeholders
with regard to this matter. I, for one, hope that the invitation is
accepted and that all of the stakeholders engage in it with similarly
open minds, particularly with regard for the role of economic
incentives in obtaining an optimum result.
III. BRIEF FOR A CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY
Savings for the Pooris not solely a book about banking. It
is about altering public policy to address the persistent problem of
poverty in the United States. At its best and most persuasive, it is
a brief in favor of a change from an entitlement approach to one
that focuses on empowering the poor and working poor to
improve their circumstances by work and thrift.
Professor Stegman reviews the history of public
encouragement of asset accumulation from the Homestead Act
forward, including the support of home ownership and savings
through the Internal Revenue Code.' He reviews a number of
recent actions at the federal and state levels to increase the
amount of property people on welfare can own and to remove
disincentives to savings in existing welfare programs. A number of
these proposals are bipartisan in nature, which is a hopeful sign
indeed.
Along with EFT '99, the principal tool of Professor
Stegman's proposal is the Individual Development Account
(IDA). While the name of this account may vary, there are a
number of common attributes of its various manifestations:

60. Id. at. 123-129.
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A key feature of all IDAs is that every dollar saved
by an individual is matched by a community group,
Another
foundation, church, or government.
distinguishing feature of IDAs is that participation
is conditional upon the saver's completion of a
financial education
program....
The final
distinguishing characteristic of an IDA program is
that withdrawals are limited to specific purposes ...
[generally] buying a house, getting an education, or
starting a business.61
Professor Stegman envisions a world where the poor and
working poor enter the banking system through EFT '99, use their
accounts as a vehicle for their initial saving, use such savings to
open IDA accounts and develop the habit of saving and attendant
increases in net worth as they move from dependency to selfsufficiency. This is a compelling vision that is supported by
substantial research and by the ongoing activities of leading
community development organizations. 2
The implementation of a coordinated program of the kind
described in Savings for the Pooris, of course, ultimately a political
issue. Professor Stegman does not deny this, noting that one of his
goals in writing this book is to convince the Administration and
Congress to use EFT '99 as the vehicle for giving lower-income,
low-wealth Americans "a chance to own a piece of the country.""
Funding for IDAs will come, either directly or indirectly,
from the federal government and, accordingly, it is easy enough
for banks and their counsel to ignore this issue and let the other
stakeholders in the poverty debate fight it out. Given the need for
financial intermediaries to be involved in the implementation of
Professor Stegman's ideas (EFT'99 and IDAs) on a significant
61. Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
62. Among such organizations is the Center for Community Self-Help in
Durham, North Carolina, founded by Martin Eakes on the basis of his insight that
the problem of poverty cannot be addressed effectively by focusing on income;
rather, that the acquisition of wealth should be the focus of effort. This insight lead
him and his organization to path-breaking activities to foster home ownership for low
and moderate income people and to a MacArthur Foundation award for Eakes.
63. Id. at 11.
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scale, banks will be involved in the new policy regime, if adopted,
whether they like it or not.'
As noted above, Savings for the Poor is an invitation to
dialogue about moving from poverty policies that have not worked
to others that may. Indirectly, banks have borne a share of the
burden of the failed policies and have met the burden at significant
expense. The new policies proposed by Professor Stegman may
provide banks with the opportunity to do their share more
When and as the conversation
efficiently and profitably.
continues, banks and their counsel would be well advised to
participate. Reading this important book would be a good place to
begin their preparation.

64. See Squeezing the Banks, supra note 19, at 53 for an example of one potential
outcome of such debate. The article reports on a proposal by the English Post Office
to operate a "universal bank" for the poor and working poor with retail locations in
post office buildings. Id. The British Government has "suggested" that banks assist
in funding this enterprise to the tune of £150 million to £200 million per year, with
each bank's contribution between £30 million and £50 million per year. Id.
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BANKING THE UNBANKED: UNTAPPED MARKET
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NORTH CAROLINA'S
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
MICHAEL A. STEGMAN
I. INTRODUCrION'

In the new economy, it is as important to have access to a
basic bank account and financial services as it is to have access to
This is why
electricity, running water, and a telephone
policymakers, bankers, and their counsel should be concerned that,
despite the longest economic expansion on record and the lowest
unemployment rates in a generation, 10% of all American
families-including 25% of African-Americans and Hispanics, a
quarter of all families with incomes under $20,000, and nearly half
of all families moving from welfare to work-have no bank
account. Assuming this same one-of-ten ratio also applies to
North Carolina, more than 300,000 Tar Heel families are
unbanked
Doing a better job of bringing the unbanked into the
financial mainstream is important because one's banking status has
profound implications for long-term family self-sufficiency. In
1998, for example, the median value of all assets held by unbanked
families was just $2,300, compared with $136,000 for all banked
families.4 Lack of savings is particularly important to low- and
moderate-income families in general and to unbanked families in
1. I would like to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Kelly
Cochran.
2. Lawrence H. Summers, Helping Americans To Save More, Remarks at the
Choose to Save Forum (April 2, 2000), available at http://www.treas.govlpressl
releases/ps524/htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
3.

FED.

RESERVE

BD.,

SURVEY

OF

CONSUMER

FINANCES

(1998)

at

www.federal.reserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/98/scf98home.html (last updated Feb. 29,
2000). For a summary of the 1998 survey results, see Arthur B. Kennickell, et. al.,
Summary Descriptionof 1998 Survey Results Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:
Results from 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,86 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (2000).
4. FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 3.
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particular because they are much less likely than other households
to be covered by a retirement plan at work. In 1998, more than
nine out of ten (92%) unbanked families were without a
retirement account, compared with less than half of banked
families (47%).5 Indeed, for more than half of the unbanked
(54%), their only asset is their car.'
In my recent book, Savings for the Poor,7 I suggest how a
cluster of new public policies-most importantly, the federal
transition to electronic funds transfer (EFT) or the delivery of
government benefits through direct deposit-present new
opportunities for financial institutions to better serve unbanked
and marginally-banked populations.
Because of EFT, the
Treasury Department has undertaken several initiatives to
stimulate the development of new, low-cost banking products for
unbanked federal benefit recipients. As part of this transition,
Congress has also required all states to convert their food stamp
programs to electronic payment by 2002, using point-of-sale (POS)
terminals at participating retailers. And, while not required by law,
more than forty states have decided to add their emergency cash
assistance programs to the plastic food stamp cards so that welfare
benefits will be accessible at ATM and POS networks.
Although the push to convert millions of benefit checks to
electronic payments was begun to save the federal government
money-as much as $100 million a year according to one
estimate-in my book I argue that EFT is more than an exercise in
cost-saving technology transfer. When viewed in the context of a
larger policy framework that rewards work, personal
responsibility, and encourages the working poor to save, EFT is
about financial inclusion and the recognition that "economic
opportunity cannot thrive where access is denied."8
In his review of my book, Mr. Joseph Smith argues that
while most banks have a profound sense of responsibility for the
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. MICHAEL A.

STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF

ELECTRONIC BANKING

8.

(1999).

ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, U.S.
AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 135 (1997).

DEP'T

OF TREASURY,
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communities they serve, they cannot always fulfill their obligations
because aggressively serving the poor and near poor "is
incompatible with operating their institutions at the most
profitable levels of which they are capable."9 While I agree that the
economics of better serving marginalized populations are critical,
there is strong evidence that significant market opportunities exist
for "first-movers" and creative institutions that do not sit back to
wait for policy makers to put government programs in place, but
rather use technology and strategic alliances to bank the
unbanked. Rather than focusing on many of the national policy
initiatives discussed in Savings for the Poor, I prefer to use this
opportunity to apply the arguments in my book specifically to
North Carolina and start a conversation with the local banking
community about the challenges and opportunities posed by EFT.
This Article is divided into five parts, beginning with a
discussion of North Carolina financial services: the decline in the
number of commercial banks and thrifts along with significant
market concentration by a handful of institutions, the explosive
growth in the number of "fringe banks"-most notably check
cashing outlets and payday lenders, and the scale of their volume."
Next, I link the national policies that are supporting new banking
initiatives for the poor to North Carolina, providing, where
possible, data and statistics that might be useful to bankers in their
business formulations. 1 Next, I summarize banking innovations
that are useful models for North Carolina financial institutions to
consider, emulate, or build upon.'2 In the final section I reaffirm
my call for certain refinements in the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) with which Mr. Smith takes issue-hopefully
explaining it more compellingly than I evidently was able to do in
my book. 3

9. Joseph A. Smith, Jr., MichaelA. Stegman, Savings For the Poor: The Hidden

Benefits of Electronic Banking: A Review and Response, 5 N.C.
(2001).
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra notes 14-47 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
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FEWER INSTITUTIONS,

MORE BRANCHES, AND GROWING MARKET SHARE

The interplay of the same factors-among them the
deregulation of interest rate ceilings in the 1980s, new technology,
and growing competition from nondepository institutions-that
led to a significant decline in the number of federally insured
financial institutions in the United States are causing similar
results in North Carolina. 4 The number of commercial banks in
North Carolina declined by almost half (48%) since the mid1960s,'" while in a much shorter period-from 1986 to 1999-the
number of thrifts fell by two-thirds. 6
Also consistent with national trends, the total number of
banking offices in North Carolina has doubled since the 1960s,"
increasing by forty in 1999 alone. 8 This is partly the result of
growth by established institutions and partly because North
Carolina continues to be fertile ground for de novo banks. Thirtyfive new banks were chartered in North Carolina during the 1990s,
14. STEGMAN, supra note 7. Nationally, the number of federally insured banks
and thrifts declined by 43%over the last fifteen years, and the number of credit
unions fell by 19%in the 1990s. Id. at 2 (citing pre-1999 data); FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., STATISTICS ON BANKING, TABLE 103 NUMBER OF OFFICES OF FDIC-INSURED
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, at http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob (last visited Feb. 16, 2001)
(citing 1999 data and grouping according to class, institution, state and type of office);
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS AND OFFICES BY CHARTER

TYPE, FDIC-INSURED SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, UNITED STATES AND OTHER AREAS,

BALANCES AT YEAR END 1984 - 1999, at http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob (last visited Feb.
5, 2001) (website provides a link to the table citing Thrift data); FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., TABLE RC-11, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF FDIC-INSURED SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS, at http:/lwww.fidc.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/0009/sircll.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2001) (citing 2000 data and grouping by asset size and insurance fund
membership); Credit Union data on file with author.
15. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS, BRANCHES AND TOTAL
OFFICES, FDIC-INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS, NORTH CAROLINA BALANCES AT

YEAR END, 1966-1999, at http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob (last visited Feb. 5, 2001)(website
provides a link to the referenced chart)[hereinafter BRANCHES AND TOTAL OFFICES].
16. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS AND OFFICES BY
CHARTER TYPE, FDIC-INSURED SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, NORTH CAROLINA,
BALANCES AT YEAR END, 1984-1999, at http://www2.fdic.govlhsob/ (last visited Feb.
5, 2001) (website provides a link to the referenced chart).
17. BRANCHES AND TOTAL OFFICES, supra note 15.
18.

FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATISTICS ON BANKING, TABLE 102A, SUMMARY

OF CHANGES IN BRANCHES OF FDIC-INSURED DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS DEC. 31,
1998 THROUGH DEC.31, 1999, at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/9912
/alll02a.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
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reportedly "tops in the nation".'9 At least two of themGreenville-based Millenia Community Bank and Pembroke-based
under-served
targeting
Bank-are
Guarantee
Lumbee
populations.?°
Nationally, most of the 29% increase in banking offices
during the past twenty years has occurred in middle-income
areas.2 ' In contrast, the number of branch facilities declined by
Not withstanding North
21% in low-income neighborhoods.'
Carolina's modest increase in de novo community banks, the boom
in the fringe banking industry discussed below suggests that there
may have been a similar decline in mainstream banking services in
low- and moderate-income communities in this state.
In the third quarter of 2000, the eight biggest NC-based
banks-each with assets of more than $1 billion-held more than
98% of all deposits in the state.' This is a significantly greater
degree of market concentration than exists nationwide, where
similarly sized banks hold 80% of total deposits.24 Though it ranks
as the nation's second biggest bank, Bank of America ranks only
fifth in the size of its North Carolina branch network, but is first in
market share, holding about 22% of all North Carolina-based
deposits.? BB&T, first in branches, is second in market share
(15%) followed in order by Wachovia (13%), First Union (11%),
and Centura (7%). Central Carolina Bank, which was recently
acquired by National Commerce Bancorporation, controls about

19. STEGMAN, supra note 7, at 2 (citing 1998 data); Randy Dennis, The Return of
the De Novo (PartIII) Final Chapter,ARK. COMMUNITY BANKER, Summer 1998, at
http:/lwww.acbonline.orglsummer98/feature4.htm (citing 1996 and 1997 data); Ed
Martin, De Novo Banks: Small Cogs Help Turn a Big Economy, N.C. MAG., Jan.

2000.
20. Catherine Pritchard, Small Banks a Perfect Fit, FAYETrEVILLE OBSERVER-

TIMES, (Fayetteville, N.C.) May 31, 1998, at DI; Ed Martin, De Novo Banks: Small
Cogs Help Turn a Big Economy, NORTH CAROLINA, 12
21. STEGMAN, supra note 7, at 2.

22. Robert B. Avery, et al., Changes in the Distribution of Banking Offices, 83
FED. REs. BULL. 707,719 (1997).
23. Number, Assets, and Deposits of FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks, Third
Quarter, 2000, STAT. ON BANKING (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Washington, D.C.),

Table 105A, http:ll www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/0009/cbstru.html
updated Dec. 21,2000).
24. Id.
25. Data on file with author.

(last
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6% of the North Carolina market.'
Several of the largest Tar Heel banks are leaders in the use
of technology to develop alternative delivery channels - five are in
the American Banker's top 50 Bank Holding Companies in ATM
ownership,' and a similar number have been judged to be among
the nation's top 100 banks in web influence.'
III. TI3E EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF "FRINGE BANKS"
IN NORTH CAROLINA

Though less understood, studied, or regulated, there is a
parallel system of financial services providers that primarily serve
lower-income working class communities in North Carolina and
the nation. The core of this "fringe banking" industry, as it is
commonly referred to by consumer advocates, is a national
network of check cashing centers and payday lenders that cash
more than 180 million checks a year with a face value of $55
billion.'
Not withstanding the fact that they are banned in 19
26. Id.
27. Bank of America is first in the country with 14,082; First Union is fourth, with
3,689, Wachovia is eighteenth with 1,374, and BB&T is twenty-first with 900. Top 50
Bank Holding Companiesin Automated Teller Machines, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1999,
at 12A.
28. View From Internet Valley: 1999 Web Influence Ranking 1-100, at
http://www.netvalley.com/banks/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2001). Bank of America ranks
number one nationally, First Union number five, Centura Bank number twenty-one,
Wachovia twenty-six and BB&T number fifty. Id. The Internet Valley Benchmark
(IVB) compares a company's zone of web influence to that of its peers and across
industries through the use of a standard value. The set level for the IVB is the
current zone of web influence for Internet Valley. One of the basic measures of Web
influence is the total number of the external hyperlinks to the company's Web site.
Internet Valley: Web Influence, at http://www.internetvalley.com/influence.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2001).
29. STEGMAN, supra note 7, at 63 (citing national statistics). Payday loans are
small-dollar, high-interest, short-term loans backed by post-dated personal checks
that borrowers promise to repay out of their next paycheck. Memorandum from
Richard M. Riccobono, Deputy Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, Department
of the Treasury, to Chief Executive Officers 1 (Nov. 7, 2000), available at
http:llwww.ots.gov/docs/25132.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,2001). North Carolina law sets
a ceiling of $300 on the amount that can be borrowed at any one time, limits fees to
fifteen percent of the amount borrowed-which translates to a maximum of $45 on a
$300 loan-and provides for a maximum term to maturity of thirty-one days. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 53-281 (2000); see generally N.C. Gen. Stat. §53 Art. 22 (2000) (relating
to "Check-Cashing Businesses").
In practice, according to state regulators, the vast majority of all payday loans
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states because of their high cost and potential for abuse,30 the
number of payday lenders has grown from just a few hundred
outlets in the mid-1990s to approximately 10,000 today.31 One
investment banking firm "forecasts the market to expand to 25,000
stores by 2002, producing 180 million transactions, and $45 billion
in loan volume that will generate $6.75 billion in fees annually. '
As suggested above, North Carolina has become fertile
ground for fringe bankers. Statewide, some 200 licensed check
cashing companies operate more than 1,200 outlets.3 While not all
check cashers in the state extend credit, at year-end 1999, some
136 companies with more than 1,000 offices engaged in payday
lending, which translates to about ten percent of all paydaylending outlets in the country. ' In 1999, payday lenders in North
Carolina originated more than 2.9 million transactions totaling
more than $535 million, generating in excess of $80 million in
fees.35 And these numbers are only part of the story of how nonbank financial companies are filling a critical credit void, since they
exclude the 300 or so licensed pawnbrokers in North6 Carolina that
provide their own unique brand of consumer credit?
One way of putting this booming financial services industry
in perspective is to note that there is one check cashing
outlet/payday lender in North Carolina for every two FDICinsured banking offices.' Five small counties have either the same
in North Carolina are even shorter term-just eight to fourteen days-which, given
the fifteen percent simple interest rate, translates to an average annual percentage
rate (APR) of approximately 460%. Telephone Interview with Otis Meacham,
Deputy Commissioner of the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner of Banks,
(Dec. 14,2000) [hereinafter Meacham Interview].
30. Marcy Gordon, Senator Condemns 'Payday Loans', AP ONLINE, Dec. 16,

1999.
31. Donna Tanoue, Remarks Before the Seventh Annual Greenlining Economic
Development Summit (June 13, 2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
speeches/chairman/spl3june00.html (last updated June 14, 2000).
32. Id.
33. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON

PAYDAY LENDING 5 (2001), available at www.banking.state.nc.us/pubcatns.htm (last
update Feb. 22,2001).
34. Meacham Interview, supra note 29.
35. Id.
36. Id.

37. This figure and all of the following data on the number and location of check
cashers and payday lenders in North Carolina are the results of the author's
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number of banks as check cashers or more check cashers than
banking offices.' And three of the state's seven economic
development districts-all in Eastern North Carolina-are
significantly under-banked. These include the eleven-county
Southeast economic development district, and the thirteen-county
Global Transpark district, where the overall ratio of fringe banks
to mainstream banks is .70 and .65, respectively.39 In addition,
eight of the sixteen counties that comprise the Northeast economic
development district are under-banked inasmuch as their
respective individual ratios of fringe banks to conventional banks
is greater than the statewide average of .50.40
Fringe banks are also expanding more rapidly than
conventional banks. The number of banking offices increased by
less than two percent in 1999 (a net increase of 40).4' In contrast,
the number of fringe banking outlets increased by 73%, or by 520
offices between late 1998 and January 2001.42 While much of this
growth has been in the poorer regions of the state-163% growth
in the Western economic development district and 125% in the
Northeast-wealthier districts like the Research Triangle saw a
71% increase in the number of check cashers and payday lenders,
including 82% growth in Wake County. 43 The Charlotte area also
witnessed significant growth, with Mecklenburg County having
forty-seven more fringe banking offices today than two years ago,
bringing the grand total of fringe banks to 115 outlets in the heart

calculations from data obtained from the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner
of Banks. Details are available from the author.

38. The five countries are Cumberland, Edgecombe, Hoke, Vance, and
Washington Counties.
39. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BANKS, N.C. CHECK CASHERS (2001), at
http://www.banking.state.nc.us/cclist.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinafter
CHECK CASHERS]; OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING, STATE DEMOGRAPHICS, 1999
REVISTED COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES (2000) at http://www.ospl.state.nc.us/
demog/rty99est.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2000); FED. DEPOSIT INS. COMM'N,
DEPOSITS OF ALL FDIC-INSURED INSTITUTIONS OPERATING IN NORTH CAROLINA

(June 30, 1999) (on file with author).
40. The under-banked counties in the Northeast are Beaufort, Chowan, Halifax,
Hertford, Hyde, Martin, Perquimans, and Washington.
41. FDIC data are for 2000 at the time of this writing.
42. Data from Office of the Commissioner of Banks, 1998-99 and January 2001
(on file with author).
43. Id.
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of North Carolina's and the Southeast's banking capital.'
While there has been no systematic analysis of where fringe
banks locate relative to mainstream banks within communities, our
own research in Charlotte is instructive. 5 We found that check
cashers and payday lenders are not scattered throughout the city,
but are more likely to locate in high-minority and working class
neighborhoods. Relative to population, there are one-third as
many banking offices and more than four times as many checkcashing offices in high-minority neighborhoods as in low-minority
neighborhoods.46 Because payday lenders target working families
with bank accounts-you need a checking account in order to
patronize a payday lender-they are most likely to locate in
moderate-income neighborhoods rather than in the city's poorest
communities. Eighty-five percent of all check cashers in Charlotte
(compared with fifty-five percent of all iouseholds) are in working
class neighborhoods with median incomes between $20,000 and
$40,000.

41

IV. COMPLEMENTARY PUBLIC POLICIES

As I argue in my book, EFT and state-related EBT efforts
create a substantial market opportunity for traditional financial
institutions. North Carolina, for instance, ranks ninth among the
fifty states in the number of paper benefit checks-more than
600,000 a month-that could be routed into electronic transfer and
other bank accounts.' In addition, more than 212,000 food stamp
recipients have now been trained to use POS terminals to access
their benefits, which has familiarized them with modem banking
44. CHECK CASHERS, supra note 39.

45. Anthony Kolb, Spatial Analysis of Bank and Check-Cashing Locations in
Charlotte, N.C., Center for Community Capitalism (Dec. 30, 1999) (unpublished
draft, on file with author).
46. Id. We identified 3.8 banking offices and 6.7 check-cashing outlets per 10,000
households in Charlotte neighborhoods that are at least 70% African-American,
compared with 12.5 banking offices and 1.6 check-cashing outlets per 10,000
households in neighborhoods that were less than 10% African-American. Id.
47. Id.
48. DovE Assocs., ETA INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT 19 (1999), available at
http:/lfms.treas.gov/etalfinal.pdf

(last visited Feb. 6, 2001)

(prepared for the

Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, Washington, D.C.).
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technology like debit cards. 9
A number of recent policy initiatives that complement EFT
promise to further enhance the economics of serving unbanked
and under-banked populations. The most important of these
involve savings initiatives for working families like those being
piloted in Individual Development Account (IDA) programs
across the country. IDA programs can make EFT and related
banking initiatives not only more powerful forces for individual
empowerment but can significantly improve the economics of lowcost account products for banks. While EFT has the potential to
bring more people into the financial mainstream, savings
incentives give them a reason to open an account and use their
banked status to begin saving for their future.
Specifically, these policy initiatives include:
Treasury's First Accounts Initiative. After launching
EFT'99, Treasury recognized that federal benefit recipients
account for only about half of the 9.5 million American unbanked
families, and that for the unbanked to become a commercially
viable market, new accounts, marketing strategies, communitypartnerships, and financial education campaigns must be targeted
to all unbanked families and not just those who receive
government checks. Congress appropriated $10 million this fiscal
year to support pilot partnerships between financial services
providers and community organizations to provide the unbanked
with access to low-cost accounts, ATMs, other electronic banking
products, and financial literacy education.
Welfare Reform. Although often overlooked, it was the
watershed Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) that helped legitimize
government's role in helping the poor build assets. The rationale
for an asset-based social policy is that assets promote a longer
planning horizon by the poor and a variety of positive attitudes
and behaviors, including household stability, community

49. U. S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERVICE, FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM, ELECTRONIC BENEFITS TRANSFER PROJECT STATus (Oct. 2000) at

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/MENU/ADMIN/EBT/statusnew.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
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involvement, and political participation." Welfare reform not only
led to new rules that liberalized asset limits-North Carolina
raised its limits from $1,000 to $3,000-but it also encouraged
savings by promoting IDAs. IDAs combine budget and credit
counseling with a program of matched savings that help the
working poor invest in a home, education, or their own business.
The welfare reform law permits states to use their welfare block
grants to fund IDAs and account balances in eligibility
determination for all means-tested federal benefits. "' A total of
thirty-one states have enacted legislation to support IDAs, with
most of this legislation occurring since 1995.2
Individual Development Accounts. The most important
thing that banks should know about IDAs is they are proving that,
with appropriate support and incentives, poor people can save.
Two-year results from the nation's largest national demonstration
in fourteen sites found that participants with incomes at about
130% of poverty are saving an average of about 3% of their
income, or $24 a month. 3 The Assets for Independence Act
(AFIA) enacted in October 1998 authorizes $125 million in federal
funds to support local IDA programs over a five-year period.' 4
After appropriating $10 million a year for AFIA in FY 1999 and
2000, in response to local program successes, Congress
appropriated $25 million for AFIA in FY 2001."5
Unfortunately, Congress did not pass the proposed Savings
for Working Families Act of 2000 in the last session, which would
have authorized $5-$10 billion in federal tax credits for financial
50. GREG MILLS ET AL., EVALUATION OF ASSET ACCUMULATION INITIATIVES 15

(2000)
51.
52.
53.

(prepared for the Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
Mark Schriener et al., Asset Accumulation in Low-Resource Households:

Evidence from Individual Development Accounts 30 (Sept. 2000) (unpublished

paper presented at Inclusion in Asset Building: Research and Policy Symposium,
Center for Social Development, Washington University in St. Louis, Sept. 21-23,
2000) (on file with author).
54. Community Opportunities, Accountability and Training, and Educational

Services Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, §416,112 Stat. 2772 (1999).
55. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. OF CHILDREN AND

FAMILIES, Administration for Children and Families FY 2001 Budget 4 (2000),
available at http://www. http:llwww.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/olablbudgetlacf2OOl.pdf.
(last visited Feb. 27,2001).
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institutions and private sector investors to set-up, match, and
support IDAs at financial institutions.- However, there continues
to be strong bipartisan support for a national IDA program that
would be funded on the tax side of the federal budget, and
renewed efforts to pass SWFA will likely be made in the 1 0 7th
Congress.
There are presently seventeen operational IDA programs
in North Carolina that are being supported with funding from the
North Carolina Departments of Commerce and Labor, and from
local support from the City of Durham.57 Early program data from
North Carolina are consistent with national findings. One national
study of eleven IDA programs, including those in North Carolina,
showed that average account balances per participant were $903,
including both deposits and accrued match, ranging from a high in
$2,361 in Raleigh to a low of $362 in Chicago.'
V. INNOVATIVE PRODUCrS FOR THE UNBANKED

In the course of our research, we have identified many
products that target the unbanked, several of which I summarize
here in hopes that they will stimulate creative thinking among
North Carolina financial institutions. Some of these products are
built around technology, others use off-the-shelf products that are
delivered through community development partnerships. Others
blend the products and services of fringe- and conventional-banks
to help transition unbanked customers into the financial
mainstream, while still others use payroll direct deposit to attract
new low- and moderate-income customers at the work-place, many
of whom are unbanked.

56. Fact Sheet, The Savings for Working Families Act of 2000 (S. 2023/H.R.
4106) (on file with author).
57. STEPHANIE A. JENNINGS, ELIZABETH KEHBERGER, ROBERTO G. QUERCIA,
WILLIAM M. ROHE, AND MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, HELPING FAMILIES BUILD ASSETS:
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT AccouNTs IN NORTH
CAROLINA 1 (May 1999) (prepared for the North Carolina Working Group on IDAs
and Asset Building and can be ordered from the UNC Chapel Hill, Center for Urban
and Regional Studies). The North Carolina General Assembly and the North
Carolina Department of Commerce have allocated $860,000 for IDAs. Id.
58. MILLS ET AL., supra note 50, at 63.
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Technology-BasedProducts

1. Banco Popular's Electronic Transfer
Account (ETA).
The transition to direct deposit of federal benefits is much
slower than the government had hoped. In the first year, only
about 5,000 people have opened a low-cost, government-designed
Electronic Transfer Account (ETA) that the Treasury designed to
take direct deposits from Uncle Sam. However, one particular
bank has distinguished itself as a model provider. 9
As of October 31, 2000, the $18.4 billion asset of Popular
Inc., Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, had opened more than 3,000
ETA accounts.' This is more than sixty percent of all ETAs
opened by all U.S. banks, but number two on the list, Firstar Bank
of Milwaukee, has opened just 405 ETA accounts.61 Banco
Popular attributes its success to three facts: (1) serving the
unbanked is a long and honored tradition of the People's Bank of
Puerto Rico-its 2001 business plan calls for converting an
additional 35,000 unbanked individuals; (2) it uses its most
sophisticated technology and delivery systems to create low-cost,
and low-risk accounts for financially marginalized populations,
including debit cards without checking privileges to prevent
overdrafts; and (3) despite low account service charges-ETA
charges are limited by the Treasury to $3 a month-Banco Popular
invested more than $100,000 in a rollout campaign and provided
financial incentives to employees for every ETA account they
opened during the early months of the campaign.62
In response to a recent Treasury inquiry of how banks
could better serve unbanked persons who do not receive
government checks, Banco Popular indicated an intent to create a
59. Lisa Daigle, E-Benefit Accounts Fail to Gain Broad Usage, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 12,2000 at 1.
60. Id.; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, ETA PROVIDERS COMPENSATION
REPORT

(Oct. 31,2000).

61. Id.
62. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico's Response to the U.S. Treasury's Request for
Information on First Accounts 3 (Dec. 11, 2000) (on file with author).
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low-cost electronic combined account that would contain separate
transaction and savings pursesY Like the ETA, to simplify
account management, reduce risk, and avoid overdrafts, no check
writing or off-line transactions would be available for this account.
This account, which would work best if combined with payroll
direct deposit, would feature a savings plan option involving an
automatic transfer of a pre-specified amount of money each pay
period from the transaction-to the savings-purse. Customers would
have electronic access to the transaction purse through ATM and
POS terminals, but to discourage savings withdrawals on impulse,
there would be no electronic access to the savings purse-all
withdrawals would have to be made in person at a bank branch. A
savings bonus would encourage balances of long duration.
2. Standard Bank of South Africa's Auto E-Bank.
According to an analyst at McKinsey and Company,
Standard Bank of South Africa is defying "the conventional
wisdom of the financial-services industry: that the low-income
market is at best marginal, at worst disastrous."'
The bank
created its E-Bank (later renamed E-Plan) program in the 1990s to
serve a growing market of low-income, largely illiterate wage
earners who could no longer receive their pay in cash because of
growing crime problems.'
When employers switched to paying
employees by check or direct deposits, Standard Bank was flooded
by waves of unbanked customers.' Operating exclusively through
a "fingerprint-secured" debit card system and ATM network that
is programmed to give operating instructions in each of South
Africa's eleven official languages, costs per outlet are 30% to 40%
below those of traditional branches.' ATM technology greatly
reduces the delivery and service expenses of transactions and sales
(since there is no back office) and the bank minimizes unit cost of
63. See id.
64. David Moore, Financial Services for Everyone, 1 MCKINSEY Q. 125, 125
(2000), at http://mckinseyquarterly.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2000).

65. See id. at 128.
66. Id. at 127.
67. Id. at 129.
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its ATMs by using education and incentives to maintain high
transaction volume.' E-Plan grew to around 340,000 accounts by
1996. By 1999, the number of E-Plan accounts had grown to 2.6
million, with around 50,000-60,000 new accounts opened each
month.69
3. Umbrellabank.com.
For several years now, the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development has supported the development of
computer learning centers in assisted housing developments. To
my knowledge, few of these "neighborhood networks" are being
used to help connect residents with banking services. A new
Internet-only bank recently announced that it would partner with
a large housing developer to target residents of such housing, most
of whom are working and trying to improve their financial
standing and credit record."
Umbrellabank.com of Westmont Ill., which opened
[in June 2000], is working with the Chicago Equity
Fund to install automated teller machines and
personal computers in assisted housing in the
The bank will also provide
Chicago area.
teach residents how to use the
to
representatives
machines and to foster financial planning and the
use of checking, savings, and credit accounts. The
new bank, a subsidiary of the $391 million-asset
Argo Bancorp,... will have access to Argo's
network of 1,000 ATMs throughout the Midwest
and East Coast, [and] plans to install additional
ATMs in many of the buildings sponsored by the
Chicago Equity Fund."

68. Id. at 129-130.
69. Id. at 127.
70. Megan J. Ptacek, Web Bank Plans ATMs for Subsidized Housing, AM.
BANKER,

June 20,2000, at 12.

71. Id.
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B. Community Development Banking Partnerships

1. Chicago CRA Coalition and Bank One's Alternative
Banking Program (ABP).
"The Coalition, which is convened by the Woodstock
Institute ... developed an agreement with Bank One when it
purchased First Chicago Bank NBD in 1998," that included a pilot
program "to promote deposit services to unbanked customers."'
Rather than a separate product, "the Alternative Banking
Program (APB) incorporates into standard Bank One products
features similar to a model lifeline account, including: $10 to open
an account, minimum balance as low as $0 ... unlimited check
writing, unlimited use of Bank One ATMs, and some free teller
'
transactions, depending on the account."73
Bank One [also] conducts financial literacy
workshops in cooperation with community partners
to demonstrate cost savings over check cashers,
improve financial management skills, and increase
trust ... with mainstream financial institutions.
Although applicants with a credit history must have
suitable credit scores, people with no or borderline
credit may also open accounts. In exchange for
more flexible credit criteria, the bank established
some modest restrictions on the ABP. However,
after one year, account holders can apply to upgrade
to traditional account[s].74

72. Marva Williams, Community-Bank Partnerships:The Chicago CRA Coalition
and Bank One Forge the Alternative Banking Program,COMMUNITY. DEvs., (Office

of the Comptroller, Washington, D.C.), Fall 2000, at 5, available at, http://www.occ.
treas.gov.cdd/resource.htm (last visited Feb. 5,2000).
73. Id. at 5. The two other features of the APB are: a service fee as low as zero

dollars depending on the account and free financial literacy training. Id.
74. Id. at 5, 17.
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2. The Extra Credit Savings Program.

community
for-profit
preeminent
nation's
The
development bank, South Shore Bank (SSB), and the Center for
Law and Human Services created the Extra Credit Savings
Program to encourage the unbanked working poor to save a
portion of their sizable Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) refunds
by providing them with low-cost savings accounts. 75 Between
January and April 2000, the Tax Counseling Project of CLHS
offered free tax preparation assistance to EITC-eligible individuals
two nights a week at a SSB branch.7 6 On these evenings, SSB
bankers invited individuals to join the ECSP. Those who chose to
participate opened a no-fee, no minimum balance savings accounts
and arranged to have their 1999 federal tax refunds directly
deposited into the accounts. Funds in these accounts earn a
market rate of interest (currently 2.5%), and a no-fee ATM card is
available. As an extra saving incentive, participants receive an
additional 10% bonus on any funds remaining in the account on
December 31, 2000 (up to a maximum bonus of $100 per accountholder).'

75. Sondra G. Beverly et al., Low-Cost Bank Accounts and the EITC: How
Financial Institutions Can Reach the Unbanked and Facilitate Saving 4 (Sept. 2000)
(paper prepared for Inclusion in Asset Building, Research and Policy Symposium,
Washington University in St. Louis, Center for Social Development).

76. The Earned Income Tax Credit is a refundable federal tax credit designed to
help low-income workers increase their financial stability. "In 1998, the EITC was

expected to cost the federal government $30.5 billion according to the Council of

Economic Advisors. More than 19.7 million working families benefited from the

EITC in 1998." Timothy M. Smeeding, The EITC and USAs/IDAs: Maybe a
Marriage Made in Heaven? 2 (Nov. 2, 2000) (paper prepared for the Annual
Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management

(APPAM) Seattle, Washington, on file with author). "By 1999 a maximum
refundable tax credit of $3,816 was available to low income households with two
children and earned income between $9,540 and $12,460." id. at 3.
77. Beverly et al., supra note 75, at 5.
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Transitionsto MainstreamBanking

1. Union Bank of California's Cash & Save Program
Union Bank's Cash & Save is a hybrid program that goes
beyond check cashing by using education and consulting services
to transition previous check-casher users to traditional banking
services.78 "[W]ith profit margins ranging from fourteen percent to
fifty-one percent at its fifteen locations, Cash & Save [successfully]
competes with other check cashing outlets."79
"But what
differentiates it is the way it tries to bring unbanked customers into
the financial mainstream rather than simply exploiting profit from
their financial alienation."' 8
Cash & Save provides a full range of services
targeted to lower-income, ethnic markets with large
contingents of unbanked workers. While each
location provides basic check cashing services-at
lower fees than those generally charged by [check
cashers]-what really distinguishes Cash & Save
from other check cashing operations is the range of
banking services that it provides. Under its Money
Order Plan, which carries a one-time fee of $10,
customers get six free money orders per month plus
a 1% check cashing charge. With Nest Egg Savings,
a customer can open a no-fee, passbook interest rate
savings account with an initial deposit of $10 and a
commitment to deposit $25 monthly for at least one
year. Cash & Save also offers a basic checking
account for ... as little as one dollar, a secured
credit card for people who are repairing their credit
rating, and a direct deposit option for the electronic

78. STEGMAN, supra note 7, at 79.
79. Id. (citing Cynthia A. Glassman, Consumer Finance:The Borrowing/Savings
Dilemma, J. oF RETAIL BANKING SERVICES, Autumn 1996, at 54).
80. Id.
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delivery of government benefits.81

Almost one third of Cash & Save customers converted to
traditional banking services in 1997, up from 14% in 1996.
2. Arvest Bank's Credit Builder CD Loan
Because many of the entry-level employees of local
poultry-processing plants were Mexican workers with no credit
histories, Arvest Bank created the $1,000 Credit Builder CD
Loan-a creative, low-cost way for consumers to develop a credit
history while minimizing risk to the bank.' Customers take out a
$1,000 loan and deposit the proceeds in a CD. They then pay the
loan back from monthly earnings to build a credit history and use
the CD interest to help offset their loan interest payments. By
repeating this process twice, borrowers gain confidence in the
bank and in their ability to save regularly and build good credit.
At maturity, the borrower has also accumulated $2,000 towards
the down payment and closing costs on a modest house. Since
1990, the Credit Builder CD Loan program has led to more than
500 mortgage loans to immigrant families-with no defaults as of
June 2000.
In the process, Arvest also experienced tremendous
customer growth among the community's Latino workers-less
than 8% of them had any previous banking relationship. "[W]ithin
two years of the launch of this program over 60% of workers at
participating plants" were Arvest customers, with 7% having
purchased houses with Arvest mortgage loans, and 27% having
had consumer loans.' As of April 30, 1999, the bank's Latino

81. Id. at 80.
82. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACt PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, UNION BANK OF CAL., N.A. 47
(Mar. 30, 1998), http:l/www.occ.treas.gov/cra/crasrch.htm(last visited Feb. 15, 2001).
83. David Bugea, Building Credit in Underserved Communities, COMMUNITY
DEvs. (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Washington D.C.), Fall 2000, at 7,
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/resource.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
Arvest is based in Rogers, Arkansas. Id. at 7.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 19.
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customers represented "a total of $26.5 million in business,
including $5 million in deposit accounts, $1.2 million in consumer
loans, $20 million in mortgage loans, and $341,000 in commercial
loans."'
D.

Bank at Work Programs

Bank at Work programs produce win-win partnerships
between employers and financial institutions because of the
savings each realizes when payroll checks are switched to direct
depositY
Citibank operates one prominent Bank at Work
program. With direct deposit of an employee's pay, the bank
offers a special checking account, special credit card offers, and
discounted points on some credit products. "In addition, the
employee is provided access to Citicorp Investment Services, nofee PC Banking Service, no-fee Bill Payment service, and no-fee
ATM transactions. ' Currently, 43,479 customers in the bank's
assessment areas use the service.' Two percent of the households
participating in this program live in Low- and Moderate-Income
census tracts.' °

86. Id.
87. Research by the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA)

found that businesses could save more than $1.25 on each payroll check processed by
switching to direct deposit. Banks save an estimated $0.70 for each check deposited
through the ACH network instead of through the teller window where as many as 10
sets of hands touch each paper deposit. Additional savings from reduced fraud are
also likely by using the ACH network instead of paper checks. Sam Frumkin &
Karen Furst, Direct Deposit: Using Technology to Reach the Underserved,

COMMUNITY DEVS., (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D.C.),
Fall 2000 at 3, available at http:lwww.occ.treas.gov/cdd/resource.htm (last visited
Feb. 5,2001).
88. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, CITIBANK, N.A. 13 (Oct. 26,

1998), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/cra/crasrch.htm

2001).
89. Id.
90. Id.

(last visited Feb. 15,
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The fact that ten percent of the nation's payday lenders and
check cashers have located in North Carolina in the last two years
should set off alarm bells in boardrooms across this state. These
businesses are acting rationally in the face of a difficult market and
are making the economics of serving low- and moderate-income
households work for their owners and shareholders. Where
traditional deposit accounts have proved unpopular with
customers or unprofitable for banks, they have succeeded by
selling money orders and check cashing services separately.
Moreover, by tailoring products to meet customer demand and by
providing convenient hours, locations, and other services, they are
converting banks' and thrifts' own relatively low-profit checking
account customers into high-profit short-term borrowers.
Some mainstream institutions are waking up to the size of
the potential market. For instance, the State Employees Credit
Union (SECU) recently introduced a lower-cost payday loan
product after a statewide sample of its branches found that 4,000
members had written checks to payday lenders.91 SECU's Salary
Advance Option (SAO) is a reusable line of credit with a
maximum loan of $500, at an interest rate of 11.75%; automatic
transfer pays the balance of the loan after the direct deposit arrives
on the next payday.' SAO appears to be a highly competitive
alternative to payday loans, which are capped at $300 under North
Carolina law and are typically charged a fifteen percent fee.' And
while only eight small North Carolina banks initially signed up to
offer ETAs to the recipients of more than 600,000 monthly federal
benefit checks, Bank of America has announced a three-state pilot
program, including North Carolina, through which, it expects to
sign up 50,000 accountholders when the campaign is fully rolled
out.' Check recipients will get account applications while they
91. Kim Nilsen, SECU to Provide Payday Lending, TRIANGLE Bus. J., Jan. 1,
2001, available at http://triangle.bcentrla.com/triangle (last visited Feb. 8, 2001).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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wait in line to cash their checks and will be able to apply over the
phone.'
Other institutions are focusing on the same market that
proved so successful for Arvest Bank. The 1997 Census estimates
North Carolina's Hispanic population to be about 150,000, which is
almost double what it was in 1990.' According to one estimate,
North Carolina ranks among the top ten states in terms of the rate
of growth of Hispanic buying power, which is forecast to grow by
255% between 1990 and 2001.' To serve this burgeoning market,
Cooperativa Communitaria Latina de Credito-North Carolina's
first Latino-focused financial institution recently opened for
business in downtown Durham. Outperforming its business plan
that set a modest goal of 500 members within the first year, the
credit union had more than 1,100 members after just seven
months.' The credit union has begun offering an international
money transfer service that costs just $6.50 to send up to $5,000 to
95. Daigle, supra note 59.
96. James H. Johnson, Jr., et al., A Profile of Hispanic Newcomers to North
Carolina,65 POPULAR GOV'T 2, 3, (1999). Most of this growth is in five counties-all
of which, are included in the top thirty U.S. counties with the most rapid growth in
their respective Hispanic populations-Wake, Mecklenburg, Forsyth, Guilford, and
Durham (ranked in declining order of their relative growth). Id.
97. Jeffrey M. Humphreys, Buying Power at the Beginning of a New Century:
Projectionsfor 2000 and 2001, 60 GA. Bus. & ECON. CONDITIONS 1,9,17 (2000). This
compares with eight-six percent and three percent growth in buying power among
white and African American consumers, respectively. Id. at 15. A combination of
rising numbers, increasing incomes and a demographic profile that favors high
marginal rates of consumption-seventy-seven percent of North Carolina's Hispanic
population is age thirty-five or younger, compared to fifty-two percent of the total
population-suggests that rising Hispanic buying power will not only "energize"
consumer markets for some years to come, including financial services. Johnson,
supra note, at 3. H. Nolo Martinez, director of Hispanic/Latino Affairs for the State
of North Carolina puts, it this way:
In the area of economic development, we're looking at what
people need in order to understand financial institutions and
practices, not only banks and banking but also savings and
investments, like buying a home. You know, the American dream
isn't necessarily a realistic dream for these new immigrants
because without formal credit you can't buy a home.
Eleanor Howe, HelpingHispanicsin Transition,An Interview with H. Nolo Martinez,
director of HispanicLatinoAffairs, State of North Carolina,65 POPULAR GOV'T. 13,
15, (Fall 1999).
98. Editorial, Bank on Latino Customers, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.) Jan.
24,2001, at A8.
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El Salvador and Guatamala and is negotiating a contract with the
Mexican Government that would carry the low charge of $8 for up
to $1,000 transfer, which would also pay the official exchange rate
for dollars to Mexican pesos on the day of the transaction.' This is
a better deal than is offered by more substantial companies and
has a large prospective market. Nationwide, "immigrant workers
sent $17.4 billion to their home countries last year, nearly double
the level in 1991." 100
Other market opportunities are as yet unrealized. Because
of North Carolina's large working poor population, the federal
EITC brings in as much as $1 billion per year to the state, '
suggesting that an effort to replicate the South Shore Bank savings
model discussed in Part IV may have good local potential. And
though state officials decided not to add cash assistance to the
electronic food stamp cards, they are considering a campaign to
encourage banked welfare recipients to sign up for direct deposit,
and to make financial education a priority of welfare reform. The
State Department of Social Services has also contracted with the
Center for Community Capitalism to conduct a statewide survey of
the financial services needs and behavior of welfare recipients and
the working poor. In addition to informing policy makers and
social services program directors, the results of this survey, which
should be completed in Spring 2001, should contain useful market
information for the banking community.
While Mr. Smith may be right to suggest that some banks
and thrifts cannot profitably serve unbanked and marginally
banked customers by expanding traditional branching networks or
by offering Treasury's ETAs, North Carolina institutions can draw
on extensive resources in fashioning other innovative programs
like those highlighted in Savings for the Poor and Part IV of this
99. Charles Fargo, From Dollars to Pesos, NEws & REc. (Greensboro, N.C.)
June 5, 2000, at A; Competition Heats Up for Overseas Wire Transfers, NEws &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) Nov. 23,2000, at 3D.
100. Competition Heats Up for Overseas Wire Transfers, NEws & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.) Nov. 23,2000, at 3D.
101. A State Earned Income Tax Credit: One Step Closer to a Living Wage, BTC
REPORTS (Newsletter of the North Carolina Budget & Tax Center, Raleigh, N.C.),
May 1999, at 1, available at http://www.ncjustice.orglbtc/v5no7.html (last visited Feb.

6,2001).
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article. Moreover, in addition to the state's extensive network of
branches and ATMs, banks have a wide range of potential
community partners who can help deliver financial services in new
ways. Specifically, North Carolina has more minority, communitybased credit unions than any other state; the North Carolina
Association of Community Development Corporations has more
than 50 members; and with continuing appropriations from the
General Assembly, the North Carolina Community Development
Initiative is supporting a network of high-performing community
development organizations." This network is ready and willing to
work with banks, thrifts, and credit unions to improve financial
literacy and to link working households to mainstream banking
services.
If the economics alone are not enough to convince North
Carolina banks to reach out to unbanked and marginally banked
populations, I advocate refining the CRA to provide additional
incentives for institutions that are examined under "large bank"
procedures. Specifically, my proposal calls for increasing the
importance of the service test-which focuses on retail banking
and community development services such as financial education
and IDA sponsorship-to account for more than its current weight
of twenty-five percent of banks' overall CRA ratings."° This
would enable a bank that is having difficulty in, say, the
community development investment area-which is not a core
business-to improve its overall CRA score by doing more to
deliver financial services in low- and moderate-income
communities-which is a core business. The fact that many banks
are finding it hard to do well under the investment test has been
confirmed by FDIC chairman Donna Tanoue1 4 and our own
research.
We recently analyzed all "large bank" examinations of
102. H.R. 1313, 1999 Leg., 1999-2000 Sess. (N.C. 1999), available at http://www.
ncleg.net/htmll999/bills/CurrentVersion/house/hbill1313.full.html (last visited Feb.
28,2001).
103. The large bank exam has three components. The lending test counts for half
a bank's total score and the investment and service tests each count for twenty-five
percent.
104. Barbara A. Rehm, DisappointingCRA Fund Gets a Lift, AM. BANKER, Oct.
17, 2000, at 4.
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North Carolina banks since the current regulations went into effect
in 1997, as well as the examinations for the fifty biggest banks in
the country. 5
Only five of thirty-two North Carolina
examinations resulted in outstanding CRA ratings. More than half
of the North Carolina tests scored in the middle-to-low range for
"satisfactory," with three earning CRA scores that were just one
point above a "needs to improve" rating. This is a sharp contrast
to the distribution of CRA scores among the fifty biggest banks,
where only about 25% of the tests scored in the low part of the
"satisfactory" range.
When the scores are disaggregated by lending, investment,
and service test, it is clear that North Carolina banks' poor
performance on the investment test is dragging down their overall
CRA scores. Of the thirty-two NC banks, ten received a "Needs
to Improve" on the investment test, while another sixteen received
scores of "Low Satisfactory." We found a relationship between
bank size-measured by assets-and investment test scores.
About half (four of nine) the NC sample with more than $1 billion
in assets received High Satisfactory or Outstanding investment test
scores. In contrast, only 9% (two of twenty-three) of smaller
banks received better than Low Satisfactory.
North Carolina banks also performed worse than the "Top
50" sample on the lending test. The one bright spot for the state
was the service test, where similar percentages or North Carolina
(80%) and top fifty (78%) financial institutions earned either High
Satisfactory or Outstanding ratings. Thus, increasing the weight of
the service test could help many North Carolina banks improve
their CRA scores while doing more to achieve financial inclusion.

105. Consult the author for more information about this work in progress at the
Center for Community Capitalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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